Its tactics include social media campaigns, the theft of sensitive campaign materials, cyberattacks on voting systems, and even the deployment of mercenaries to unstable regions.
The most commonly used tool, according to analysts, is the spread of propaganda and disinformation—especially through social media platforms, where coordinated operations aim to disrupt democratic processes in countries around the world.
Experts interviewed by Poland’s PAP news agency say the country could become a target of intensified Russian interference ahead of its upcoming presidential election.
Disinformation would be employed to sow confusion about voting procedures, polling hours, and candidate profiles, including falsified information about their platforms or poll results.
Poland’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has confirmed a recent uptick in disinformation activity, citing data from NASK, the national computer security and research network.
According to Monika Gembicka from the ministry’s communications office, one such operation, believed to have originated in Russia, was recently detected in the English-language information space.
Magdalena Wilczyńska, director of NASK’s Information Protection in Cyberspace division, said that NASK has created a "map" of key disinformation themes ahead of the election.
She also warned that conspiracy theories might erode public trust in the electoral process.
"There may be claims that people without voting rights are participating," she said.
Other anticipated disinformation threads include false claims about the European Union and alleged foreign interference in Polish elections.
One of Russia’s signature methods is the orchestration of large-scale, coordinated activity on social media. Under orders from Russian intelligence services, operatives create hundreds of fake accounts that disseminate content designed to inflame social divisions and manipulate public opinion.
These campaigns gain popularity thanks to platform algorithms that amplify provocative or emotionally charged content, including videos, images and memes.
Sowing discord within democratic societies is a cheap and effective way for the Kremlin to attempt destroying those societies from within.
A notorious example was the operation conducted by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Kremlin-linked troll farm, during the 2016 US presidential election.
Similar interference occurred ahead of Catalonia’s 2014 independence referendum and Brazil’s 2022 presidential election.
A second method involves cyberattacks targeting voter registration systems and electoral infrastructure.
During the 2016 US election, 21 states reported intrusion attempts on voter databases, with multiple breaches traced back to Russian actors.
A third tactic is the theft and public release of compromising materials aimed at discrediting specific candidates or parties.
In 2016, the hacking group APT28, linked to Russian military intelligence, used phishing to obtain and leak sensitive emails from Hillary Clinton’s campaign staff. The publication of these messages, some of them classified, created a media scandal that many believe affected the election outcome.
A similar operation targeted French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron in 2017, with his campaign emails leaked just days before the runoff vote.
Another common disinformation technique involves posing as legitimate media outlets or fact-checking organisations to spread false narratives.
According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), Russia's goal is not only to promote pro-Kremlin narratives, but also to amplify interests that align with Moscow’s, such as weakening the European Union or spreading anti-Ukrainian sentiment.
The EEAS reports an uptick in techniques such as impersonating real media outlets, recycling debunked stories and publishing fake fact-checks.
One of the more sophisticated methods, known as Operation Doppelganger, involves creating fake websites that mimic the appearance of reputable Western news outlets.
These sites publish fabricated articles or counterfeit magazine covers. A report by Alliance4Europe revealed that between March 4 and April 4, nearly 300 posts targeting Poland’s upcoming election were identified on one such platform.
According to Aleksandra Wójtowicz, a digital technology analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs and co-author of the report, these posts often included links to articles from real Polish news websites.
This is done to boost the credibility of the posts, even though the context is distorted or the content entirely fabricated.
Russia has also used paramilitary contractors to exert influence, especially in Africa. In the Central African Republic, for example, the Kremlin forged an alliance with the authoritarian government under the guise of a security partnership.
Since 2018, Russian Wagner Group mercenaries have taken control of key state structures in exchange for mining concessions for gold and diamonds.
Another frequent tactic is to repurpose old media headlines or manipulated screenshots, banking on the likelihood that users will not click on links or read full articles.
This approach increases the effectiveness of disinformation by stripping headlines of context.
Polish media outlets, critics say, often use ambiguous or sensationalist clickbait headlines to increase the number of click-throughs on websites. Such headlines can be easily misrepresented in this way.
(rt/gs)
Source: PAP