Gen. Jarosław Stróżyk, head of the panel and chief of Poland's Military Counterintelligence Service, said on Friday that Poland must do more to combat foreign disinformation campaigns
The report, produced by the commission’s disinformation task force, focuses mainly on the period since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
The commission presented its findings at a press briefing on Friday, emphasizing that Russia has intensified its disinformation efforts since the start of the pandemic.
'Informational dominance'
The report describes Moscow’s goal as achieving "informational dominance" through deception and manipulation of public discourse, social processes and digital networks.
The study highlights various methods used by Russia, including diplomacy, propaganda, psychological campaigns, cyber-infiltration and hacking attacks.
A major actor in these activities is Ghostwriter/UNC 1151, a hacker group believed to be responsible for efforts to destabilize Central European politics.
Russia spends up to USD 2 billion annually on disinformation and propaganda, according to the report, with some estimates putting the figure at USD 4 billion.
One of the key findings is that Poland’s counter-disinformation efforts have been "insufficient, ad hoc, inconsistent, and often superficial."
The report criticizes the lack of coordinated defensive measures from Polish institutions, including the foreign ministry.
It states that no systematic long-term strategy was implemented, and countermeasures remained limited to monitoring, training and vague cooperation guidelines.
The report also accuses former Polish authorities of failing to take decisive action despite having information on individuals and organizations spreading pro-Russian and pro-Belarusian disinformation.
According to the commission, these omissions weakened Poland’s ability to detect and neutralize information threats, including state-sponsored disinformation campaigns.
Major setback
The 2015 "destruction" of a planned NATO counterintelligence center in Warsaw, which was meant to combat Russian disinformation, is cited as a major setback.
The report describes this as the most serious disruption to Poland’s and NATO’s ability to counteract cognitive warfare, a term used to describe strategic manipulation of public perception and decision-making.
On the night of December 18, 2015, a group of several dozen associates of then-Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz, led by his aide Bartłomiej Misiewicz and supported by military police, forcibly entered the NATO Counterintelligence Center of Excellence in Warsaw, breaking locks and forcing safes open.
Antoni Macierewicz. Photo: Przemysław Chmielewski/PR
Bartłomiej Misiewicz. Photo: Wojciech Kusiński/Polish Radio
The center’s offices had been operational for only a few months. The unauthorized entry and forced access to classified materials sparked controversy over Poland’s handling of NATO-affiliated institutions.
Two independent legal analyses later confirmed that the center was an international institution beyond the authority of Poland’s defense minister or prime minister, state news agency PAP reported.
The 80-page report, available on the justice ministry’s website, examines Russian cognitive warfare techniques targeting Poland.
It details Russian strategies, major propaganda narratives, and Poland’s readiness to counteract such tactics.
It also includes case studies on disinformation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, migration at the Polish-Belarusian border, climate issues, and Russian interference in elections in Georgia, Moldova and Romania in 2024.
'Poland still needs to do more'
Stróżyk stressed that Poland must strengthen its institutional response.
“The main conclusion of the report is that Poland still needs to do more, both institutionally and practically, to counteract Russian and Belarusian disinformation as well as other emerging threats in the information space,” he said.
The report criticizes the previous government’s decision to abandon plans for a cybersecurity department within the Internal Security Agency in 2016.
It also notes that the foreign ministry’s Strategic Communications Unit, established in 2019, initially had only three employees and was unable to mount an effective response.
Similarly, the commission found that the National Research Institute’s Disinformation Prevention Department, launched in late 2022, was underutilized.
Among the commission’s recommendations is closer cooperation between authorities and media outlets, particularly in crisis situations, to prevent information gaps.
The panel suggests that public institutions should provide journalists with direct access to eyewitnesses and uncensored visual materials.
The report also proposes that intelligence agencies publish declassified reports on disinformation threats.
“A comprehensive anti-disinformation strategy is needed, one that includes input from experts, journalists, and civil society organizations,” the report states. It calls for increased public funding to combat disinformation more effectively.
Stróżyk announced that within 10 days, the commission would file a report with the prosecutor’s service on the dismantling of regional offices of the Internal Security Agency under the previous government.
He has previously said that the 2017 closure of 10 out of 15 regional offices significantly reduced Poland’s intelligence capabilities.
The commission on Russian and Belarusian influence was established in May 2023 as an advisory body to the prime minister.
It does not conduct investigations or hearings but analyzes state documents, academic research, and expert reports to assess foreign influence on Polish public life.
The panel's next report is expected in March.
(rt/gs)
Source: IAR, PAP