Maia Sandu's victory in the closely-fought presidential run-off on Sunday, along with the European integration referendum results two weeks earlier, suggests that Brussels should carefully consider its policies toward countries where a pro-Western stance is not yet firmly established.
To recap, 55.33 percent of Moldovans voted for Sandu, while 44.67 percent supported her pro-Russian opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo.
While this margin is notable, it is important to recognize that Sandu’s support is concentrated primarily in central Moldova, especially in the capital Chișinău. Her win was largely secured by the sizable Moldovan diaspora in Western countries.
Similarly, the referendum showed only 50.35 percent support for European integration, with Moldovans living in the European Union, the United States and Canada playing a critical role at the ballot box.
What conclusions can be drawn from this?
First, in my view, European integration should not be tied to specific political figures or policies.
In Moldova, EU leaders were eager to endorse the incumbent president and her pro-Western stance. However, Sandu’s decision to link the presidential election with a referendum on European integration was a misstep.
Her association with rising gas and electricity prices has, in the public mind, connected higher costs with European integration, likely reducing support for the pro-Western direction.
Second, the European Union needs to improve its information strategy in Moldova and Georgia. Brussels' efforts should be more visible.
Ironically, one of the most pro-Russian regions in Moldova, Gagauzia, benefits from substantial EU investment, particularly in infrastructure. Despite Gagauzia’s economic ties with the EU, including significant exports, the region still votes overwhelmingly for pro-Russian politicians.
Moldovan experts attribute this disconnect to the influence of Russian media outlets, which are popular in the region, and Moscow’s portrayal of itself as the "eternal defender" of Orthodox Gagauzians.
A third conclusion is that the EU still lacks an effective response to Russian propaganda.
For example, narratives such as gayropa—the unfounded belief that joining the EU will lead to mandatory pride parades in every Moldovan town and societal "Westernization"—remain influential in Orthodox communities, often perpetuated by clergy.
While the EU aims to protect the rights of all minorities, Moscow promotes a narrative that EU policies are exclusively focused on LGBTQ rights, overshadowing the fact that, under the EU, the rights of groups such as the Gagauz would likely be better protected than in Russia.
Another takeaway from the election is that Russia remains a formidable influence in Moldova, contrary to some Western assumptions.
Since February 2022, many analyses have suggested that Russia's focus on the war in Ukraine leaves it with limited resources for operations in countries such as Moldova or Georgia.
However, recent events suggest otherwise: an extensive network of vote-buying (estimated at anywhere from 130,000 to 300,000 votes), propaganda spreading from television to Telegram, and voter mobilization efforts in Russia, Istanbul, Baku and Minsk all point to significant Kremlin involvement.
It is hard to believe this is solely the work of Ilan Shor, a Moldovan oligarch based in Moscow; the Kremlin’s influence is clearly at play, despite claims that Russia is focused exclusively on Ukraine.
While the West celebrates Maia Sandu's victory and the pro-European referendum result, it is important to remember that Moldova faces another election next summer. Moscow is almost certainly prepared. But is the West?
Piotr Pogorzelski
The author is deputy editor-in-chief of Radio Poland.